

Composite of intelligence reading analysts in Cuba was build-up
was unique in precision intelligence operations.

It came with understandable caution in raising any
alarm over the possibility of MRBM's in Cuba.

[Community did not "ignore strong, direct evidence"
on missiles. Direct evidence was weak; impact
of it was appropriate.]

Problem was 1) prior probes, presumptions
and because of them, 2) was build up, speed, scale,
progression not treated as
"indirect evidence."

[These things were almost as likely given. 3) intent
not to put in MRBM's as given intent to put in
missiles. Hence, "Almost as evidence"
with Aug 29,

(Exhibit to Holmes & 1/2 from 3) were "unproven"
- popping - i.e. unpredictable, unpredictable, unless
have means to put in MRBM's.]

?
A mistake: lack of direct evidence taken as very strong
evidence. But no direct evidence not appear soon.

22
In 30 days ending Aug; only 7 reports on "murders" (Colate).
Next 30 days, more than 40; and about 40 between 20 Sept
and 14 Oct, including a few on large numbers.

In latter period, 6 reports relating to IL-28's, 4 on May 21st.

(checked?)
In mid-Sept, no evidence of Gov's intentions and no
evidence that strat. missiles had already missed

15 Sept. letter from source: Political zone in Panama but Rev
governed by Gov 20 of 7 Sept; access to gives controlled;
internal concerned with missiles. Disseminated 18 Sept.

Agent: Control pilot arrived on 7 Sept; reports for RBMs.

Dissemin. 20 Sept

Agent: Chief of war plans; have atomic weapons. 21 Sept.

Refugees: convey, 12 Sept, charters 50-4; 5 Sept 21 Sept

Refugees: to be convey, Port located on 7 Sept 23 Sept

" to be convey, Port located on 7 Sept 23 Sept

Agent: unloaded at Marina, 17 Sept; unloaded 10 Sept 20 Sept

(Comments: More likely that source discussed

2-2 consider big unloaded)

Refugees: returned at Marina.

More later, but there enough for strong impression

April - Sept. over 1000 reports from CIA Army Counterintelligence Bureau

April - Oct. 5700 51 files

4700 reports from refugees, Opa-Lake.

Reports in thank words of Auguste indicated to committee that
scale and magnitude of influx of Elv. personnel &
equipment into a non-Elv. country was unprecedented in
its military and activities.

When refugee reports were so severely biased that all
with refugee reporting seemed to be regarded with strong
suspicion. — Subjects, being very apprehensive, they could be
affirmed US to elaborate action from Central.

[perception of bias → reports of "persecutions" by
Elv. and low residential weight.] —

Though still, could influence neon activities,
help from hypothetical; focus attention —
all these activities being very sensitive to info,
requiring little "weight" accepting very
high false alarm rate. — check, private.

Threshold for this allegedly lower than for US military, military leaders
& military personnel, including US military, & military equipment of evidence

7. Decisions on air attacks; routes rehearsed? Why put on Saturday? (to show cover story?) Why land in Miami?
8. Decision on ~~air cover~~ & air strike. Effect of "imposing".
9. Effect of K letter.
10. What happened on air cover; decision, operation.

Thompson? 50 threats? Apparent success
of air attack on Saturday?

Questions on Bay of Pigs: Johnson

1. Was there a chance landing would take place before election?
2. Was there a participant in the field — as plans changed to landing?
3. Why was small number considered adequate for landing?
4. Role in JFK's mind of his campaign pledges?
5. Fear of loss reelection; of comparison to Kennedy, Bay?
6. What advisors US involvement could be secret, maximum?
7. Why did JFK rule out US intervention — press conference April
How much did this influence him later?
8. Plan for US help after gov. established on mainland?
How big, how soon?
9. Role of Stevenson; did he know? Did he influence Bay?
Was his earlier influence important?

1961

See for is statement by State: ^{reports} doubts that Castro would let
US establish missile bases.

1955

Aug 23, 1955: again with Eden, Pres 1 impression from
standpoint of time, for Kerguelen (Kerguelen 1. Do
nothing till can judge timing of Pres. Min. meeting - then decide
whether desirable to proceed. [after Pres. Min. meeting]

Dec 1, 1955: Pres. informed to let Kerguelen proceed,
pending Eden's response.

May 17, 1956: Agreements forthcoming for this being:
Mauritius relevant under existing circumstances
[after Belgium - 6 visits?] [UK flights?]

The weather change in low altitudes is more than experienced!

Sept 1, 1956: UK aerial explorations from Canton Island.

OK

5. Who/why/when decision not to 'get Castro' is seen
between him, J.E.?

6. Did E. discuss, predict, how many missiles
would turn up in Cuba, then or later, and effects of
this?

7. Did we stress possibility that Cubans might gain control:
inter threats, war?

(Cuba, we stressed too many: control. why?)

and private statements placed no restriction on
type or purpose of low weapons - Cuba.

If weapons were put under Cuban control,
this would reduce likelihood of US attack on Cuba; but
they weren't.

Why do rockets on Cuba "enhance" Cuba's
defensive capability? more than missiles in S.S.?

"Military equipment Cuba needs for its own defense."
but w/ J.C. manning & control. If low rockets already in S.S.

4. "How could Cuba be a threat to US?"

Consider relative size & resources, of this country.

But what resources were being given
of scale of deployment in Cuba? US could have
easily & quickly put more SACMs in Cuba than
US had SACMs in Europe. What then of
"little Cuba"?

Questions on Cuba:

1) What led to emphasizing danger of nuclear war?
(not emphasizing non-nuclear acts by US) - why the
"What were the facts? Any discussion?"
Why, "full retaliatory response"?

2) Why did SU maintain deception after Oct 22?
Where they taken completely unprepared by US disclosure
no plans to respond? ... How did they mean to
announce after Nov 6? Why no word of these
plans? ... (See statement by Pres. of USSR - given? -
Oct 23). (See Nov of Oct 73) ...

3. On deception: if SU had no need to let world
Cuba, given economy, etc. of missiles in SU, and if
rockets in SU were available for retaliation why hide the
fact that in Cuba "for offensive purposes"? If all
weapons in SU are "defensive" then can statement of 1st Oct

Effects of secrecy: Effort to keep activities X secret
in one's own country (in part, to keep opponents from
focusing on them) may keep one from focusing
attention on activities X by opponents.

1. Questions

17 July 1972

K's attempts to re-formulate his positions on long standing
East-West issues will be formulated with an eye to
opening the ground for a new cycle of negotiations
without serious anticipation following the 15 Questions.

17 July 1972 The subject of long term peace remains. It is
that no action will be taken on the 1-2 issues till
after the 15 Questions, suggesting the time was coming
close on the problem.

Contract got in coverage concerned info on Soviet intentions
and Cuban compliance therewith. No reporting sources in
the US provided a specific hint as to her intentions, and
no sources close to Cuban leadership provided anything
specific on their decisions and actions w.r.t. her build-up.

DDI, IAR, DDIA, DASA, DDCI

Intelligence meeting group

Report to Bureau: On, Good Staff of IAR;

Chief, CH-500; Co-Dir. Dist. Dir. for Internal Reference;

Spec. Off. Task Force 4, 1944.

[What if there had not been the intelligence buildup
in Cuba? What if kind of intell. situation to Cuba
had been much less? ... How much difference had
buildup make?

(Action started between Jan - March '62; its intended
intensification March 14, '62 after receiving preliminary findings
of W/5, 25-02, 1st & 2nd Divs. Anticipated increase
in action by end of Feb.

112 - 20 Intelligence House included action on March 12.

Do desire for recognition of quality from US, resistance
to admission of inequality;

there for bilateral relationship; but unwilling to
compromise.

Asian presence of class of captives, precluding
genuine, lasting accommodation (so, expectation

that what will break agreement, "eventually"?

→ high level of aspiration → willingness to
sacrifice (even) → depend on the of G. and
optimism.

I think more that both have to be regarded as
there is reason to look for, possibly

NH 11-9-62 Gordon Low Foreign Policy 21 May 62

Low which, on a matter of general policy, to answer
with a political risk of rising then over force to
reduce broad goals. Each in non political cases I
(and messages made by pro-Low forces within.)
The challenge to Vietnam is to get great victory
and then more important is to get great victory to
involve risk of a direct encounter between US & Low forces.

! The point which Low did mention is that the
not over Low victory, is not that they would not be
in contemplation of US to regard victory as ^{high} ~~low~~

It's effort in "national liberation" campaign interpreted as
meeting Chinese criticism that US & Low were only not
attacking the use of force.

The evidence of any fundamental suppression of policy in
the light of a somewhat sketchy record of events.

(General purpose) will not, in many cases, cause the
loss to even significantly greater action than is
contemplated than they are now willing to contemplate.

(Loss of interest in Cuba caused by Castro's identification
of Cuba with the U.S. - Moscow will avoid assuming
explicit military obligations to defend security of regime, e.g.
by making no mention of Moscow's role. Loss of interest in Cuba
prosecution, attack and self-interest with the U.S. will
be seen as a result of Cuba's loss and will be a factor for
expanding Cuban movements & influence in the continent.)

(Expected pressure on Cuba, but since nothing about
of ^{in Cuba} regime would pay off there, little compliance seen.)

see Bill signed from 1946 in Berlin

included in first draft of SNM

IMO objected on basis of intelligence of Dole talks on
not moving from to elections; the 1st 1/2 paper, statement can be taken

3 Aug: (Bill H. Ford?) - See Features in Berlin - last one

that the chances are better than ever that.

29 Aug: more progress little hope in further negotiations and
have decided to move forward militarily, accomplishing
purpose of the various objectives of a peace treaty, at
some point in the process, signing it.

(Korean War - Korea talks late July; never came to demand,
no NATO talks in progress; threat of separate treaty
in short time (President) overall, abolishing last 2 amendments
offer in Berlin, passed by C. C. Kimball

1945 cancelled on basis of this news

for 2 Sept.

"Accepted" on 11-15-67

11-15 (Don) Thibault's draft Right 7

(copy of Don's draft Right 6)

at least
judgment - provision which cannot be supported by the
evidence

believe Don's policy is in a sense of at least of
provision - measures to bring about reconciliation regulate
- believe - they have settled on terms of their further involvement now
- further believe that Don is still not serious
of signing a peace treaty until they have either been able
to implement its basic provisions in advance or have
what they consider adequate assurances from U.S. that
such provisions can be implemented with no problems.
(acceptable)

Draft 8/15 11-15-67 10 Right - draft 11-15 meeting

"Believe" it was just signing it

where - proposed to have measures,
prohibition of signing draft with

The Left Public has stated, "Comrade" BR

was "Reassuring": "elections" seem first an internal

affair for one near postponement.

Left: Cannot see future in Berlin

Dr. Bauer declared a "peace" is sought near Berlin...

It was then by Bauer intelligently asked out - a separate

treaty. The next few months are indicated by evidence

on continued negotiation of negotiations. Discussion

likely that it will continue to make serious violation?

comes in order to accomplish discussed - de facto some

of the changes which would flow from a peace treaty

(Discussion discussed about into it from the Left!)

specific statement of Left appears to make out a

separate treaty in the next few months. It is possible

that some appreciation of the situation at this time, perhaps

convinced with the increase of tension near Berlin, has led

the Jews to conclude one sign that a separate treaty

which poses a threat challenge to its Western power, and

assess. Berlin is too dangerous a course.

(So SIVS process starts on new publicity treaty;
doesn't conclude that this is unlikely, but makes
concessions to CIA since in discussion said "it was then paper";
then Sept 1 statement however some change in conclusions
(and really confirms NR in belief in general cooling-off) but
without changing discussion.

Why should Pass take the seriously? Why not
appear different version, not consensus?

NR people convinced to CIA that "they had the
basic evidence" on other hand, (from that) OVE
thoughts NR had some evidence they didn't have; they ^{ONE}
might not have the info in private. even that
NR had. Neither had even Dals-Ron memo.

(Why not make weaker estimate after Sept 11?

Instead of saying information (?) the thing is - 13 Sept
reference to 11 Sept statement.

Then, 15 Sept, I was signed agreement with
from that from would not station minutes on its
will — after ~~with~~ minutes of refusing to sign this,
proceeding for more extensive coverage part.

Looked to from like for the request: "We want
station minutes from you, if you don't want us."

STN 15
Memphis, 25-3-62 2000 Subversive Workers Organization in Cuba
requested 10 Sept

and, The Military Building in Cuba, 14 Sept 62

Purpose is to defend some regions ~~the~~ against what
the Cubans and have conclusion to be a real danger that
it may attempt to use the (again). Have evidently

Changes from 14 Sept draft in 17 Sept draft

Notes: The USSR has granted more credits to other states, but not with much special flexibility, and it much more cost to itself.

add: The (1 Sept) estimate as a whole is probably a substitute for the guarantee which the Centre requires almost certainly has been made.

[Signal - info - depends on personal alternatives]

(I am now moving of providing the USSR and allowing Centre to provide the USSR by giving the USSR and the Soviet within existing principles.

Notes: note that 1 Sept statement for first time established links between 'Berlin - Cuban crises' and DoS-200?
highlight that US action in Cuba would be contained by DoS-200?
also names DoS-200.

(read aloud)

11. The Irish themselves are probably still uncertain about
their future course in Europe. Ireland, they are engaging
[future military program]

in a situation reminiscent of examination, carefully watching
US & EC reaction as they go. [probably intend to test
go & EC reaction as they proceed.] At the same time they
are obliged to take their place in managing risks of
cooperation with the US

While it is our judgment that, even in the light of
recent developments, Irish policy remains fundamentally
unaltered, we cannot exclude the possibility that
there is at least considering a change in the policy

Consequently they seem to realize that to provide within
their types of weapons to Cuba would pose a ~~challenge~~
to serious and clear-cut challenges to the US
[Chang's here on challenge to which the US might
possibly respond.]

On the whole we believe the House would not calculate
that the T2-25s could be supplied to Cuba in
more than very small numbers without serious risk
of US intervention.

[Chang's here on not calculate that a modest
number of T2-25s could be supplied to Cuba without
serious risk of US intervention.]

(Chang's here on not of US reaction a slight loss
lost of confidence in it.)

The establishment of Cuban rail of our striking forces
which could be used against the US would be
incompatible with low price ^{presently} ~~as we~~ estimate it. X
It would indicate a low price willingness to risk
what then the US has risked before, in
1912

~ While the US might think that the political effect of
delaying the US by stationing our own striking forces in so
surrounding a position would be worth a good deal
I don't if they could get away with it? they would.
Almost certainly not estimate that this could be done
without provoking a long-term US reaction. X

If the military advantages of a low attempt to reach
also as a strategic strike were unmarginal
a balance, with the risks great

[change to: Although there may be some military
advantages in the risk would be great...]

The political implications were extremely adverse.
[They would run counter] to the kind of policy the
Pres is actually pursuing in C.A.

What: The intrusion of low ability persons into the
sphere was only because of the fact that persons

[Political? for example: to acknowledge, perhaps because
consequence, it is true that certain were being allowed
to "win" rather than lose because of "Silver Throat"
at least till after election. As though the actual losses
pertaining to the improvement in low position expected
after election — which I am told will that would be
prevented by risk of conflict with VC

beliefs for or against the power of mind here:

It is unlikely that the D.C. as a whole could be
brought together on any kind of unit action. It is
almost certain that the D.C. would be split between
members advocating a unitarian position & those supporting
a unitarian

18 Sept: D.C. Draft Conclusion:

(Mindless D.C.) would be incompatible with D.C. practice
to date and not D.C. policy as we presently estimate it.

✓

From: 1) Possibly K thought that by Oct 13 JFK
already knew at least of preparations for NQVW;
maybe 10-15, but decided to ignore.

2) JFK on morning of 26 Oct (like Thompson, RFK) - if
we were on this case, there for great breakthrough
to improved relations.

3) High-stopping needs by Rusk on evening of 26 Oct,
emergency to that we were getting out of its intention,
concession on Turkey; resignation to deal on 27 Oct,
if we look to...

Anger at Johnson - but why? In speaking 26 Oct,
K. Stewart? For encouraging ^{still?} to act, for Turkey? In
making it necessary for us to republican, harder to accept -
instead of leaving us free to alter, if necessary?

✓

4. Private channel - encourages personal involvement,
'a relationship', leading to personal commitment in
highly sensitive understandings

[tendency to personalise low gear - as 'K, he'
he couldn't mean 'you can't do that to him']

Thompson emotionally involved with K

5. K then to broader conversation in sociological, cultural
terms - some that he is to lead him to feel self-disposed
later, but he has expressed himself (very about relations?),
expressed himself, admitted intimate private time
including many references to Allen (to Mother, seeing
Schumann's methods; from the book, "German divided,"
from the front, "German shall not rise again.")

second class

6. Pissara - intelligent, stammer badly worried in talk with
K in Moscow. (what?) intelligent. Adorovsky felt

1911 didn't show up well in talks (not first day?)

Pissara would the second night be released in the company
Fullbright hinted. (Mother? Schumann?)

Personal Diplomacy

1. Did K suffer, by a lapse in relations with GCR because of Cuba? or credit? or special? colleagues to compromise?

2. Letters from GCR were treated for him. Letters from K?

3. Also read content was there in private channel? How different from public? (From State letter meant for internal publication).

Was did K include confidence, through channel? Did he express himself; contrary colleagues; before some sections; would part mistake, back for criticism, leave for decision; internal problem?

Did he never respond to GCR's question in Vienna?

Did there ever change from Vienna?

(Was did he did, to say, "I am coming to touch paper"?)

V

Merrill, Kap & Ciba

1. These different inter. "philosophies" abundant:

a) 1957-61. OSSE (1961): 80 thousand opponents, hostile,

2. OS - orientation toward the principal opponents;

centralized; strict banking structure; (to control lib.?)

(to control bluff, wouldn't risk confrontation over

Bank of L. didn't have the cards, wouldn't gamble

on opponents' interest; wouldn't risk on effect of

force on allies.

b) Ciba/State. 80 countries, away from direct confrontation,

I don't tell even my close friends the value of
bits of evidence. What to be used by Ciba & Eng
was not stated to

✓

10/1/77

3 Aug

DCI: Forward arrival of 2000,
national operation of forward
which includes several of men &
entirely, said US can't face
the possibility that of USSR
thru the front of MREMs, in case
as a step it could justify

Because of US missile bases in

11th - Turkey
(prior to move of 34th)

[Decl. SU, R were refused
directly to USK estimate of
4 in 3-ft 3 w.c. MREMs]
(27 2-ft R-IFX)

10/1

21 Aug: also included since

10 Aug: showed how and greater
than thought previously, prob included
some.

8 Aug: DCI briefing to R. Sub Policy Com

10 Aug: DCI, MREMs - In (MREMs)

10 Aug: Taylor report for review & action

10 Aug: 20/1/77 memo

10 Aug: 20/1/77 memo
revised

8 Aug: 2d Aug diff. with
again scheduled for period
beginning 10 Aug: 10/1/77

11 Aug: 20/1/77 memo
J, RFA, Taylor, R, M, G,
etc.

DCI: 10/1/77 memo, MREMs
(currently?)
possible, & because of US actions
11 MREMs

27 Aug: DCI briefs Base on this

27 Aug: R. M, N, 20/1/77, M, G, etc.

DCI discusses with Base on 27 Aug

✓

18 Aug. Checklist should be same.

28 Aug meeting: agreed criteria & problem for OS actions

agreed: VSA 181.

a) action of life (?)

a) MSA 1000

c) first set. ... of ... 31 Aug (Heavy Rain, 28 Aug)

... by MSA (last in Sept. of 31 Aug,

including month (?) of 29 Aug mission.

28 Aug 061 started ... 8:45 by ... to ... 28 Aug

27 Aug: ... began ... highlights to ... 28 Aug.

Till 19 Sept.

21 Aug 29 Aug: ... 11:15, ... 28 Aug

mid. ...

7 Sept. ... to ... at ... 28 Aug

from 28 Aug, 5 Sept. could be ...



27 Aug USIB meeting: Carter, in 1 That on

27 Aug, 1966, planned from out of town; considerable rain
very delay of 22 Aug caused by weather, said to
not have been ~~with~~ getting low-level photos

| 2001. Left Wash 22 Aug to West Coast, left US
on 30 Aug for Panama, returned 23 Sept

56 30 Aug. (told of 20 Aug photo?)

Pass told - (checklist, 31 Aug.)

Am 4+5 Sept, Carter visited Santa Fe, Rio de Janeiro

By about 6 Sept [her name; retention in Sec 7.8.17]

Be more detailed understanding of 29 Aug flight but not subject

to report 2. another kind of mission with - possibly

1965 - at Casa ^{Chase} (Chase is informal Pass, R. Nelson)

(Left: no equipment had been developed in USSR)

(Pass - hold info)



Further info is study needed to find source, cause.

7 Sept: COMSEC, at request of R, several articles available
for review of Bureau.

10 Sept: Letter to McN,

14 Sept: USG advised SG on status for Bureau and review of Bureau,
No operational consideration postponed till receipt of further
U-2 coverage, are available.

14 Sept: CIA study concerning Bureau into review 5-10 coastal defense.

18 Sept: item in file

[13 Sept: USG contacted? / Did Proc know of contents of Bureau
before making statement?]

(Aug?)

10 Sept: White House, R, State, McN, Center, handled

340

21 Dec 30 Aug, U-2 over, 2nd batch, scheduled on 9 Sept,

big step. 4/8 Sept loss of Soviet flight, Bureau was flying

Waves, reduction to visibility operation 2 Sept.

✓

8) The normal report was discovered (see 6 msg).

Hand intell. - short lines - not used as to be be be

a sense of alarm is a feeling that urgent action required.

Details of 54-22 and other advanced defense system

(see 22, see 23-24) had been known in N. of Aug 1

and this prob. would fully reported. Hence, when

came out as a report, but as a problem to be dealt

with deliberately (may even have caused to allow some

of urgency of 23 Aug, known later during than unknown).

[Crisis of 23 Aug - to 24th even]

First step to provide systematic coverage of east of Aden,

for public story. No immediate need for full coverage of

area of 2 previous missions

of finally, straw blow: Aden claiming imminent invasion;

see from in Berlin after election

[6 Sept: Aden to Aden, Aden to Aden] [Aden to Aden]

Also could not damage Aden as containing issue

[Aden from of incident]



R related to Tree (7) intended consequence of Ch.
concerning remainder of island - - -

~~It is for ...~~

(A written record of disease not to be readily known, but in obtaining approval for tracks & it was necessary (?) to provide someone to do it).

Plum spruce (antennae) 2 left flights in relation to
the position of antennae 2 left joints - 1988

Area of original land, A_0	3 original trees
------------------------------	------------------

1915 85-2-12 The diamond, orange diamond in the
light - degree of red & white & yellow, green
in some. [?]

but failed to give adequate weight to force of law vs.
and to great bulk of money by law person.

Eigenschaften des

1. Introduction - Chapter 1 to 10 and 11 to 12 to 13 to 14 to 15 to 16 to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 22 to 23 to 24 to 25 to 26 to 27 to 28 to 29 to 30 to 31 to 32 to 33 to 34 to 35 to 36 to 37 to 38 to 39 to 40 to 41 to 42 to 43 to 44 to 45 to 46 to 47 to 48 to 49 to 50 to 51 to 52 to 53 to 54 to 55 to 56 to 57 to 58 to 59 to 60 to 61 to 62 to 63 to 64 to 65 to 66 to 67 to 68 to 69 to 70 to 71 to 72 to 73 to 74 to 75 to 76 to 77 to 78 to 79 to 80 to 81 to 82 to 83 to 84 to 85 to 86 to 87 to 88 to 89 to 90 to 91 to 92 to 93 to 94 to 95 to 96 to 97 to 98 to 99 to 100 to 101 to 102 to 103 to 104 to 105 to 106 to 107 to 108 to 109 to 110 to 111 to 112 to 113 to 114 to 115 to 116 to 117 to 118 to 119 to 120 to 121 to 122 to 123 to 124 to 125 to 126 to 127 to 128 to 129 to 130 to 131 to 132 to 133 to 134 to 135 to 136 to 137 to 138 to 139 to 140 to 141 to 142 to 143 to 144 to 145 to 146 to 147 to 148 to 149 to 150 to 151 to 152 to 153 to 154 to 155 to 156 to 157 to 158 to 159 to 160 to 161 to 162 to 163 to 164 to 165 to 166 to 167 to 168 to 169 to 170 to 171 to 172 to 173 to 174 to 175 to 176 to 177 to 178 to 179 to 180 to 181 to 182 to 183 to 184 to 185 to 186 to 187 to 188 to 189 to 190 to 191 to 192 to 193 to 194 to 195 to 196 to 197 to 198 to 199 to 200 to 201 to 202 to 203 to 204 to 205 to 206 to 207 to 208 to 209 to 210 to 211 to 212 to 213 to 214 to 215 to 216 to 217 to 218 to 219 to 220 to 221 to 222 to 223 to 224 to 225 to 226 to 227 to 228 to 229 to 230 to 231 to 232 to 233 to 234 to 235 to 236 to 237 to 238 to 239 to 240 to 241 to 242 to 243 to 244 to 245 to 246 to 247 to 248 to 249 to 250 to 251 to 252 to 253 to 254 to 255 to 256 to 257 to 258 to 259 to 260 to 261 to 262 to 263 to 264 to 265 to 266 to 267 to 268 to 269

but I can think in terms of slow-paced progress
for USA, Brazil, Indonesia, under Cuban pattern ^{completely} ~~already~~ different.

Also, Indonesian program breaks pattern in regard
under low program to supply gear mainly by Indonesians,
delivered in past confrontation with their training, changed
to accelerate delivery to Indonesians low mainly (Cuba
mainly by low conduct partially under normal pattern.
unmanned even though political you not invited;
risk of excess Anti Indo.

Re Indonesia PAVE initiated later discussions; not invited
as request & against continued unemployment; even did it
about C activity

DCI

7 Sept: work to Carter saying frequent report saying;

"my hand is in the night pass. ^{presently} short-range

some of portable type [50-1-22] which could cover

important targets in SE US - low. Caribbea"

[Q. I imagine 50-4 is portable, possible?] 2

10 Sept: "Pittsburgh for me to relationship extensive with

(13, 16, 20) defenses being established in Cuba... appear to

views provided

6-10/1 ENE (SG? Pres?) are quite possible measures now taken

are for portable of covering vicinity of some

offensive capability used as response to be

initiated by lower status: present phase constituted

and costs reduced ^{from} by availability of budget

NOTE Study notices...

14 Sept: Do not work to be ready learning the matter

but believe all a man must have been informed

of danger of a surprise and also that intention of

make these possible bound are capable of being destroyed

✓

one color defense system operation.

[OVS, etc. in effect among 50 products on basis
of OVS reliability; & based on US will, which
M.C. & K. have more about than estimation.]

20 Sept: observation on OVS. One on observation from all

that an offensive by force on color will provide
some with most important & effective leading position
in connection with all other critical areas and those
they might take unilateral action to establish new
position."

As a result of OVS's presence, chairman, examination
of other methods of action (OVS had called on 27 Aug;
called on 7 Sept, Bush had called about OVS on 7 Sept 1960)

Note: The information was in form of what might
be necessary after the establishment of a complete
A-2 defense, had made use of O-2 especially, with the

[SNIE. What are the]

"Why are they 'hanging' under till after the election?"

Will the position be better then? (Not asked.)

What are reasons for keeping the money? (Yes?)

Just to be nice? To get better known?

[Effect of Delay] to reduce incident

to risk incidents; and to add to cost of

incidents? (Also there feeling that incidents

there would be no transfer with incidents to US

response there would be trouble in handling?

What was our plan in case of abandonment?

What was our expectation of US response?

|| | What if belt 5 - any of flight had been

shot down?

|| | What would our losses have been? Expected?

|| | What would the losses have been? Actual?

Final return of money of MCMC?

Platons.

Do rivers really conserve? When has a
conflict drifted? (Bosnia & Herzegovina? Iraq?)
(Did Iraq really conserve Shaggy, or provide an escape
for misinformation, inaction?) (Germany? Korea? Cuba?)

Is it fair to fear of appearing to risk complacency,
making cocklebur socialism is inevitable, appearing
unity rather than incubating it? e.g. the following
Coke advertisement; U.S. Institute committed to eradicate control in drug

Find altitude of Peak: S.G. toward S-E incident.
 Differ from in 1.5 ft from altitude of
 known in May 1964? In winter was high
 thought some vegetation. Did they have water if they
 attached? e.g. water irrigation to hole?

important thought that only at the point would the
have noted the introduction of such weapons as MBRMs

[Thence: a) McC thought MBRMs would not come till

very later; did not think they were already in?

b) Was McC surprised to learn they were already in?

What other specifically surprised at the consequence?

c) When were willing to use other means than U-2 if necessary?

d) Wonders if U-2 had been shot down, a big story?

(Might have been serious suspicion, need for surveillance;

pressed SU either to be more explicitly or reveal more?

What then?)

e) When did we know there - 35 personnel in shot down

by SU according about location?

f) Did McC, then, agree that U-2 program was adequate

for light? Did he press for coverage before 10 Oct?

100-28954

19 Sept, USIA: Center started working to move SE-101
new idea; simply also could be put against to SG

(On 12 Sept, Center move to 1st Def: argument "necessary
action (including SG approval) to provide for replacement,
also directed by higher authority of tactical-type action"
against site at Rome.)

19 Sept. US rep. brought SG on low level of against
Cuba; but 1st Def. (shown)

Center said: "we cannot put in that the collection is
Cuba; otherwise the Base would move. Base is the
the points of decision in the war."

1 (Note: mention 12 Sept press conf)
consideration of use of
SG approval. Simply it must meeting;

27 Sept, Center forwarded to USIA program for the use.

1st mission (28 Sept - 2 Oct) programmed to move Cuba;
but should cover

17 Sept. Checklist - set of low tide marks 4-22

27 Sept. Correspondent advised to Hansen

19 Sept. The [unclear] by [unclear] (Dues requested)

17 Sept. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] + [unclear] [unclear]

7 Oct. The } [unclear] [unclear]

9 Oct. Common

First [unclear] [unclear] for [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

March 7-8 Sept. [unclear] 11 Sept. First [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

site 2, 17 Sept. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

detected.

Major construction at [unclear] [unclear] by 11 Sept.

Notes: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] of [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

[unclear] to [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

211 [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

1 Jan 62. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

✓
In May 12, NPIC started review, Photo Evaluation of
info on Cuba. Between 31 May - 5 Oct (7 issues)
NPIC examined 175 news reports referred to it for comment;
only 3 cited misstatements. That couldn't be linked to SSM as
criteria unclear; NPIC requested those 3.

14 Aug 51 editorial weekly of NPIC's office [from 1947?] not
to publish any info until in misstatement has till it had
been checked out with NPIC. (matter of intell.

Technique, not policy)

[Info printed as banning publication without comment?]

C1 checks NPIC (10 Aug and 3rd) 35 separate reports,
4 more by phone; in all cases NPIC either checked the
misstatement or made negative finding.

[Did this stop publishing?]

In Sept, 882 reports on internal security and
defense (only the small percentage of no comment).

Knowledge of Analysts state deployment of SAT
was going on (after 24 Aug - 5 Sept) plus difficulty in
obtaining evidence in tally of Spencer from other records,
showed MRBM deployment.

[e.g. should make it harder for operator to
justify his own feeling of conviction;
or to communicate the substantial weight of a report.]

[Should operators/analysts be caught in false
alarm during the process?]]

Spencer In Constitutional case was targeted for action, not
as another location where illegal activity was
to be should be targeted by Spencer [was this a
category?] but as a major SS-C site. Spencer took
in Spencer for dissemination to target Canada. Also on 23 Sept;
known on 21 Sept, also 17 Sept, received 27 Sept, looked
like case coming. Canada on 13 Oct (COMSEC targeting
Working Group, Comp by C14)

Presently requires search near [Chickens?] for
loss of some inside, constitution, further attention to SS-4
[Chickens?] [Burdell?]

Wants 27 Lht, night home, written item for CIB, report
for inspection. 2 P.H.

2 P.H. 25/1/44 (v. C. 2nd, for 1st).

(Maurice, other, "technical" restriction - night home left.
restriction only in CIB?)

Restrictions should apply to Checklist, but mention of this
(cards?) seems for Cuban info largely on the Cuban

^{CA}
Dr. J. Manning to which have not apply; His cut off

Ch. from info on offensive operation (Restriction applied)

[Cut off Para?]

by other volume of news material on Cuba!

Within Checklist group, on any other C.I. officers,
know that possibility of 4000 have had been raised by R.I.
and recently discussed with Para 16 in cut off section

(NSA-14 181 Report, editorial review, except in form of 5815).

Should it have been published without review?

Analysts ^{too} sensitive to the potential political impact of the reports they were reviewing; this would not have influenced them against publishing, but would have made them want to be double sure of no subject with anything back to Jim. That is, however.

Also, rigid compartmentation between COMSEC-86

org. responsible for collection and the intell. analysts.

Even if my CIA analysts on Cuban problem were not identical chances. Hence, they did not know that no highlights of Prison at Pinar del Rio and Los Villeros were included in light program or that the program was already delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photo identification they had requested would not have been forthcoming, so they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.

At that time, it would have appeared as Cuban Daily
Newspaper, but might have come in checklist (proof
not been submitted about process for C-2); as Oros
might have known, there was suspicious activity around
in Cristobal about 2 weeks before he apparently died.
He was targeted, but concern not published
Proof that SG first heard of the concern on

7 Oct.

Day of 7-10 days before analytical correlation of reports and
SG meeting, due to unknown processes of admin structure. (?)
collecting SG; Machine designed to provide
diagnostic participation of Machine before events before
and Machine used inside, procedure dating to early days
of U-2 ops. Interested for content of diagnostic Strategic
action of U-2, not for tactical (action) situation. After
10 Oct they were followed. [But, were?]

Left program that 26 days from 12 Sept (earliest
in which 10 Sept decision could have been implemented)
through 7 Oct. (Cloud cleared again on 17 Sept;
26 Sept sun. Breeze, 29th Lake of Pines - Big & Big;
5 Oct. perhaps, 7 Oct. perhaps).

On 20 days with Bad. we were entirely overblown
($< 15\%$ cloud cover).

Effect of SG decision of 10/2/84 & weather events
delay consideration (?) of what action should be considered
until early October.

Kindly & Holman, who told (Baker) that we were

By late Sept, delays in room (?) - sense of urgency
of continued low building, had generated greatly
increased sense of urgency in Wash. [Who?]

But high level consideration of NRC's change in
time of low return after SA-2's fully operational.

No direct evidence of action toward withdrawal of SA-
dependent areas till 26 (Aug) night of 4 Oct.

DC: SA-2 flight was now (before last 2 light files) restricted
by presence of SA-2 to SE quadrant of below: questioned
whether this was a reasonable restriction at the time,
particularly since SA-2 were almost certainly not operational.

[Did others agree on restriction?]

SA ordered NRO (present?) to prepare recall program
for removal of SA-2 for night of 7 Oct.

6 Oct. COMUSMACV moved to NRO still front. & Rearguard.

USC considered this on 6 Oct.

Bundy & Helms, who had been in the room,

9 Oct. 66: VRS first reconnaissance: O-Z police were

suspect. MRE as soon as weather permits.

Flight also to pass over area of SAM sites

though not nearly operational. This

secondary (?) objection to status of SAM

to ensure risk is getting complete O-Z coverage is

best as possible.

NAD's 2d mission ^{SAM} if there is no ~~last~~ mission

to the initial O-Z route, ~~main coverage of~~

within mid. of island by multiple O-Z simultaneously

as soon as weather permits [Approved?]

SB recommended. ahead of 1st, Pass approved

immediately (?) Warning of Sam inhibited reports of the

area. Mission delayed by weather till 14 Oct.

[Historical: accident that site was 1/2 hour early.

?
would have been finished at 10:00 AM.]

Bundy + Holman to total Bank - West savings

After this session of formal, C/S occurred ~ 10 Oct

Many photos of 28 Oct & 29-30 water (seen by U-2 ~
17 Oct, along with others) in checklist of 11 Oct

(after 10 Oct)

10 Oct: OGI briefing of C/S Subcommittee of House Subgroup on

building, including El-28. Connected on N.R.S.M. on

lines of cables, adding that there were many reports

which did not believe the house would make much a

noise, but he differed with them; told SC he

had a threat for one flight the next day - on

11 Oct. Carter T. Holtzcliff; 40 Oct. Water [10 Oct]

said, saying on water but no land evidence.

12 Oct: Carter to Stevens - House Bill (Carter, Carter available)

13 Oct: Dr. NAC told OGI, early morning; OGI - Carter.

Carter said would tell Taylor & Canale, that if he was present.

[36 lines?] No info. because premise, OGI decided not to

want to tell morning to tell NAC & State; about 2200 he passed to

Bundy & Halpern, who told Bush. Next morning, Carter - OGI Briefed NAC.

initial actual deployment.

Nothing on low state, preparation for deployment as base.

4 July (initial): Paul & the kids, reading some low

mid. and I, specifically some advanced equipment

used as MIA-210 and SCAR, initial. It already

knowledge to submarine, Egypt is long.

18 July. C1. Paul had left previous without named liability

& communique, "a pretty good sign that visitors

unconductive

18 July 67. NIE 55-2-12 2.4. Proposals in Cuba on initial

foundation for Moscow.

I. By force of circumstances, USA is becoming more and

deeply committed to presence in the Central region.

USA, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect

and defend the region in all contingencies.

As in the case before, it is likely that the US will station

in Cuba the combat units of my description, & that the

presence of the sat.

c. The law would most certainly never intend
to harass them as capable as adults are
but have sought to create the impression that Colo
was under the protection of the insult power

d. We believe that Colo will continue to lose its
existing positions to Colo [to defensive measures]
such policy would not preclude the possibility of
some advanced jet fighter Colo, modern weapons, or
even a large number of F-105s

I Produce the meaning of "most certainly
believe
would not preclude

1 Aug 2006? internal paper to West area if not all
slide probably in changing military camp to Cuba.

(As 1997 commit in some info - its construction report
of Royal Cuba to Cuba that could be relevant to the
take back process was mentioned.)

(DIA thought increased shipping due to Trade toll 22 Aug?)

4 Aug CIA item - suspect some, in Cuba

7 Aug - information that shipping would be fully.

8 Aug 2006 Original Public Policy Group, including, involved of
the military camp in Cuba area.

10 Aug 1997 2005 entry: 1001.

12 Aug CIA: prob 3446

3 Aug, 25 Aug

10 July Taylor, because of extensive use of room in
following Chinaman and set in Tulsa, about 1001
for comp. reviews of room

16 July: DLT recommended to DCL that V-2 flights over
also be continued at this altitude 2/100 level.
In justification, review mission level provided
"Conclusive evidence that recovery reports of notes
is possible because of Radio wave below," and
"most important result for my evidence of
subsequent of SA-2 mission only for McCall is above."
Approved by SG on 19 July, the Base.

21 Aug McC, R, H, J, DCP, J, J, McC

22 Aug NSC/151 analysis of facts not "fact" period
reports of radio SA-2 mission only for McCall is above
weekly US

21 Aug: DCI total growth in available time, 10 Aug

inhibited water, low water than previous

Handl. took in hand 3448; arrived here of

MSDM:

Surprise

Recipe for Total Surprise Despite Warnings —

Inapplicable After the Event

A. Strong belief ^{and desire} that danger, if any, will not come before a certain date; all evidence regarding consistent with this

B. Strong incentives not to prepare for it, plan, or prevent measures taken necessary (ie before a certain

date — e.g. ^{also, say} Section — a total precaution — ^(preventing precaution) ~~Precaution~~ — or unless necessary) to avoid forming public opinion, ^{clearly expectation} ~~Precaution~~.

C. Limitations on action, previous posture, to avoid providing danger sooner or at all, or to provide grounds for saying to ^{or internal circles} ~~claim~~ ^{claim} ~~precautions~~

D. Restrictions on dissemination of info — relating to future threat — ^{subject to interpretation} ~~is understanding~~ ^{current} ~~threats~~ (in which ^{Public Harbor} ~~you~~ ^{say} ~~don't believe~~, and ^{also} ~~don't want to act against~~ 1. ^{Public Harbor} ~~say~~ ^{also} ~~also~~

Public Harbor Warnings: But Belief that threat is to

different place; strong wish not to prepare for possibility that attack will be (when it comes).

^{much}
This evidence is thoroughly consistent with
Threats A and B. (Attack now or attack later;
attack later, ^{only before, not, later} no attack; attack here, attack there;
attack this way, or that.)

I believe strongly because of presumption, ^{or} special, private
evidence, that B is much more likely than A. In fact,
A is highly unlikely. But I do not wish to reveal that
there is new evidence ^{at 21} supporting A:

1) I do not wish to reveal source of info.

or 2) I can't reveal crucial parts of evidence disproving A
part of an allies

or 3) public has different presumptions, prior beliefs;

new evidence would lead them to demand action.

4) Govt of public or Allies should interpret evidence differently...

5) " " " " have different goals/values; if

their attention were focused on A or possibility, would demand action
of action perhaps...

6) There are costs, constraints, risks that can't be revealed to

public, or public would understand differently, or public is ignorant of
possibility of action, or effectiveness, less than public knows or can be told.

7) In particular, revealing even limited information of A to leading or

Allies might trigger undesirable reactions.

or the press, etc. in "too costly" for other reasons besides revealing to them.
(p. 17.)

Moreover; if I think need to prepare for A is
urgent, though perhaps (except for communication
aspect) desirable (e.g. if it could be done
secretly: no leaks, no signs, to public, allies, enemy, etc.)

(ii) I can prepare for B, covertly without
preparing for A, or even while unpreparing for A
(increasing vulnerability, raising odds if A does occur,
neglecting A, protecting A will not occur, ^{Cuba} threatening incredibly
high odds if A should occur, doing nothing to defend B

[Cuba: desires to resume visits that admin. regarded as
crimes of A, would not if A, while emphasizing that no
immediate facts of A: predictions + threats, "warnings" (public
warnings ignored by SO. — Bay.)] defensive

2) think I
BOR: (iii) I can preprepare for B with small risk;
2) right about it will not prepare for B, it would cost. (Bor.)

444
Hence: I refrain from preparing for A etc. all of I even
disapprove. I even refrain from preparing for B.

Then A occurs. So, B occurs, and assumption
icc (i) + icc (ii)
i) - ii) above then not wrong.

Trouble explaining why no preparation, apparently about
no expectation of A, when there was evidence pointing to A.

Exp. when Premise A is weak, or seems unreasonable, or
another for it can't be reversed;

and/or Premise B can't be explained.

So, total failure to prepare for A seems
inevitable: either negligent, or deliberately malicious.

(i.e. nature not to prepare for something that is expected, and is
expected to be costly for nature: for individual or otherwise gain).

(Truth: it is regarded as low prob, but ^{was} desire not
to prepare for it at all, or to focus public attention on it,
or to support belief by public & others that it has very
the moderately low prob that seems valid.)

Meanwhile, there is already a description of public
or other that there is any evidence supporting A

(Admin regards it as invalid, or less strong than it will

be to others, or contradicted by other evidence, ^(prior facts)

or as "Story for A vs. C, but really generated by and
pointing to B.")

But in dissemination. See.

Special case:

You half expect B, but you want it to come as a
surprise: to Admin, public, Congress, etc. or as
opposite surprise to you.

In arranging this surprise, A seems as a real
considerable, not that seriously.

surprise to you — and finds you totally unprepared, for
reasons hard to explain — concerted with efforts to ensure that
B will come, if at all, as surprise.

[B might be our action: a desired, faint example.]

To achieve faint example: 1) encourage close states of mind

2) don't encourage counter-propaganda, predictions; 3) don't seek an
opponent likely to keep memory of A secret.

Persons ^{a)} Negative Evidence Regarded as Strong
and ^{b)} positive as weak

2) I thought more lead time required, not only for
IREM (there were documents "in time") but
for SS-4 (did McC expect SS-4 in "field work"
- SS-1-3?)

2) Excess. confidence in SI?

3) Some use of private "channel" with substantial to safeguard
of decision; esp. given with question, following, political committee

4) SO failure to view info to date, needs as evidence?

5) SO check the "copy off"

6) Some distortion of Golden Reports; somewhat more of local reports.

7) Political bias of refugees to exaggerate the involvement of Poland

8) Untrained observers; question of Riga

9) Excess. pressure of SPK to compound evidence

[Unsubstantiated? Possible indication of SPK & NKVD]

5) Reports uncorroborated by local analysts about known are coverage?

6) Did analysts know of local SS letters?

6) 7) column for security situation; 8) 9)

3 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)

Admin was pretty strongly into that A - MRPMs

Before election - wouldn't occur; was not operating

degree of concern (2 & 3), situation, figure, figure, figure

in that B - in the other direction - in the other direction

Operational (into, up, down) of program, for personal, advantages

Just like Jerry.

1) What were we doing to detect B?

2) In retrospect, would it have been enough? Or would we have been more successful in detecting B?

3) What would we have done if B had occurred?

4) How to stop B?

5) Finally, but without detection would we be able to stop B?

The bottom line: What can we do to stop B?

Pearl Harbor - Long - Cuba

No insurance against Theft is insured so as not
to ~~insure~~ ^{insure} against losses from Theft & which would
be ~~insured~~ ^{insured} ~~losses~~

(slight up to 4 A — 1), short thin branch — mostly erect,
 back that increased against B — mid-tree — on 1
 brought latter and 1 undoubtedly to by very under ()

This was the Minkus Top Pattern

Place a Paul Harvey passable - if you had not told it

Now solvent: GAS & CURA POSSIBLE?

(If only 1965 had been completed, under immediate cost
had been part of review of intell. & action.)

no. 100 program adequate relation to local - time and

Plants of water from the same creek. They have been quite satisfactory.

2-31-78, MON. - 1st. Stage 2 to 3rd. 1000 ft.

Book for ... 22 ... 11.17



CI from P. 2000

Sunday: 11:00am P. 11th. In U. Tent 5:11

Exp. Can. ID 11. R. 11 to 2.

5:45 11th + 11th to 3

6:30 P. 11th + 11th to 3.

U. T. Miller Center.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Phon. 0525

Enter 17.5

Ready to U that and + 2:19 Kaddy EOT

2:20 U that second message - initial direct report.

S.C. 1st Challenge Begin

11:50 State message 212 In message turned back

rel. at 8 am. May intercept that broadcast

Feb. 26 Sat. 12:00 12:00

7:50 am Message broadcast.

6 pm letter from U

Letter from U to U that - staying away from you.

Refused message 30.

4 pm 4 pm

Sat. 27 Sat. 10:00 10:00 K. letter in Radio Message, 10:00

Enter 10:5-11:00 U2 that from In. 10:00 U2

10:50 4:35: 1st from In. "10:00" U2

Continuing frequently message + still 3:35 message U2 that.

S.C. at 4 pm. 2:45 from In. 2:45 message to U2 Transmitted

Oct 23 Sat. 12-6. ^{Thurs. 11-10} Pres. 11-10. 11-10. 11-10.

K. L. H. 11-10. 11-10.

Pres. 11-10. 11-10.

9:50 O. 11-10. 11-10.

2:00 OAS 11-10.

4:45 11-10. 11-10.

11-10. 11-10.

4:00 11-10. 11-10.

11-10.

Oct 24 Sat. 10. 11-10. 11-10.

9. S.C.

2. 11-10. 11-10.

7:24pm K. L. H. 11-10.

1:59 11-10. 11-10.

(11-10. 11-10.)

(11-10. 11-10.)

[Power] Power can be used to

- a) achieve national objectives internal & external
- b) create national unity
- c) create personal / political unity for
- d) achieve personal unity: Prin, U.S., U.S., U.S.

U.S. U.S. to use national power for

(C) or (d) [Cuba] could lead apparently to
United States Power would be willing to use it for
(C) or (d) — even though "justified" for C-d, "unjustified"
for (C) - d.

Low power, + H.P.P. = Low power internal

P, H, F in U.S., and create political legends for
Prin & Admin. Prin has no "rights" to participate

possibly, or even to reject, yet if he accepts this,
it will not only make him lose prestige & status, and
lead to death; but both allies & enemies will believe

he will never use power (and, without
unanimous distribution of all in that). But Prin

32 125.

32 - 125 - 11

25 - 125 - 11

A child's drawing on lined paper. It features a large sun with a face, arms, and legs. To the left of the sun is a small figure that looks like a person or a stick figure. The drawing is done in a simple, sketchy style with some shading.

۱۰۰

No:

Box 10, 56	by parcel on the Bay of Pigs.
W. J. R. McGowan	

After Bay of Pigs, I got 3 rats under 1000;
6/10, 10 rats at 1000 to 5000 and 10000.

2-10 didn't want to play because of pressure.
Dillon played for 2 while Tom left.

To SAC Los Angeles & counsel, re: SAC (Rafael)
for coordination; Scott's Study for Submission
(Re: SAC, Honolulu, 80031)

Pr. water

Wed Oct 17. at country + State

Emb.

Bill: like U-2 incident: mistake or weathering?

or 100m

Thompson. Could be hearing bird song. (?)

" about West

Sept 7

Sept 8 1891

Sept 9. 1891

Rem.

Sept 10 1891

Steady

Dec 11 1891

R. J. Stewart

Col. C. H. C.

Col. Fred. Parker (USAF) (Comm AFIC)
(Alman)

Col. General Parker (Army; Alman, Parker)

77th Clothing, Galtman, AF Lt. Galtman Off

(As. Attache: Hungary, Hungary, Hungary)

(As. Lt. 1st, after Hungary)

Col. George Kegan

John E. Patton, AFNIA

XNT

Dave Gault to 10A (Was of CI & JEFF)

(Was 10A)

F. M. 19 (U.S.) Parker, (Was. Head of CI in 1944)



SIDE

A. What was SU SIDE when they left?

What was the point of departure?

B. What was the point of departure, without further delay?

C. What if he had been on 24-45 bus? (with no doubtless?)

After he returned, what was his last

of course, after he returned to the house, did not

what was his last home?

D. What was the probable location of the plane, if it was

E. What did R probably learn from others?

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1. Why did I not see the box of papers in the chest?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

2. Why did I not see the box of papers?

3. Why did I not see the box of papers?

Later 2.11 to Oct 15, Oct 15-22, 23-24

Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

4. Why did I not see the box of papers?

5. Why did I not see the box of papers?

6. Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

Why did I not see the box of papers?

(It did long ago, and)

7. Why did I not see the box of papers?